The rapidly expanding hardware-intrinsic security primitives are aimed at addressing significant security challenges of a massively interconnected world in the age of information technology. The main idea of such primitives is to employ instance-specific process-induced variations in electronic hardware as a source of cryptographic data. Among the emergent technologies, memristive devices provide unique opportunities for security applications due to the underlying stochasticity in their operation. Herein, we report a prototype of a robust, dense, and reconfigurable physical unclonable function primitives based on the three-dimensional passive metal-oxide memristive crossbar circuits, by making positive use of process-induced variations in the devices' nonlinear I-Vs and their analog tuning. We first characterize security metrics for a basic building block of the security primitives based on a two layer stack with monolithically integrated 10×10 250-nm half-pitch memristive crossbar circuits. The experimental results show that the average uniformity and diffusivity, measured on a random sample of 6,000 64-bit responses, out of ~697,000 total, is close to ideal 50% with 5% standard deviation for both metrics.
Introduction
The advent of the information technology era has stimulated an unprecedented expansion of interconnected networks and devices. The sheer volume of personal and sensitive information continuously carried over shared and remotely accessible networks poses significant security challenges [1] [2] [3] , which cannot be adequately addressed by conventional cryptographic approaches.
Most conventional cryptographic approaches rely on "secret keys" stored in nonvolatile memories for data encryption and access authentication, which are vulnerable to physical and sidechanneling attack including such direct probing and power analysis. 4, 5 As a result, security approaches based on physical hardware roots-of-trust have recently attracted significant attention. Somewhat analogous to biometric identifiers such as retinal and fingerprint imprints, hardware roots-of-trust are physically embedded with their cryptographic data through unique, individual structural properties that are virtually unpredictable and practically inimitable. 2, 4, [6] [7] [8] [9] The cryptographic data should be immediately and reliably available upon interrogation, and effectively impossible to learn or extrapolate, even when challenged by aggressive model-building and machine learning attacks. 6, 10 A class of hardware security primitives, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), draw their cryptographic "keys" from fabrication process variations. Among the wide variety of proposed PUF architectures based on spatial variations in electronic hardware 3, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] , resistive random access memory (RRAM) crossbar architectures are very promising due to their simple and relatively low-cost fabrication process, small footprint, low operational power, CMOS integration compatibility [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] , and process-induced variations in I-V characteristics pertinent to the mixed electronic-ionic transport and ionic memory mechanism. [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] The most accessible manifestation of process-induced compositional and structural spatial variations in RRAM arrays is the spatial variations of effective switching thresholds, i.e. the voltage at which device conductance is abruptly changed upon application of a ramping bias. A related example is spatial variations in the ON and OFF state conductances in the array upon application of a large voltage or current bias. [26] [27] [28] [29] The physical source of these variations is arguably, the stochastic nature of filamentary conduction, arising from compositional inhomogeneity of the switching medium as well as variations in individual device profiles (e.g. electrode imperfections, random variations in surface roughness, etc.). 22, [30] [31] [32] These "entropy" sources are hence, the almost exclusive foundation of the earlier proposed RRAM-based security primitives. [33] [34] [35] Majority of such proposals are theoretical and, moreover, the many proposed architectures assume a relatively large array size 9, 26, 28, 35 , extensive peripheral programming and control circuitry 28 , and strict evaluation protocols (due to the relatively small signal-to-noise ratio of spatial state variations in optimized RRAM arrays) to achieve viable operational metrics.
Furthermore, limiting the network operation to a binary memory array ignores the nonlinear transport via RRAM devices and reduces the array to a simple resistive network. The average distributions of high resistance and low resistance states likely follow a log-normal distribution and are typically similar for different spatial distribution and across different array instances.
Relying on such spatial entropy sources is therefore likely to pose challenges in creating unique security instances and largely ignores one of the main advantages of RRAM arrays -their analog programmability. Moreover, relying only on high/low resistance state distributions may result in a systematic bias towards one end of the side of the resistance distribution, thereby reducing the effective array size, regardless of control and evaluation schemes.
Spatial variations in binary states (i.e. nonuniformities in ON/OFF between array devices) are average, mesoscale exhibits of the inherent stochasticity of filamentary conduction mechanisms in RRAM devices. On the other hand, transient and non-linear characteristics of individual devices can potentially carry the embedded nanoscale stochasticity information with much higher fidelity. [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] This is specifically true for operation in higher resistance regimes, where current transport is dominated by nanoscale local compositional and structural defect structure and electronic defect structure. [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] The main caveats of this approach are the temporal stability and long-term reliability of network properties. While some of the hardware primitives may be tolerant to temporal fluctuations of device properties (such random function generators), majority of the security primitives, including PUFs, require a very high degree of stability for viable high throughput operations. We believe that unique opportunity is presented by nonlinear electron transport, which is typical for many valence-change (VCM) analog memristors. The nonlinearity depends on the programmed state and applied bias and is closely correlated to filamentary conduction's stochasticity. 23, [48] [49] [50] [51] It can therefore be utilized as a prominent source of the "entropy" in RRAM arrays, towards the development of robust security primitives. 52 The core focus of this work is to utilize such inherent entropy of analog RRAM arrays to create robust and reconfigurable security primitives. We utilize monolithically integrated two-level stacks of CMOS compatible analog RRAM arrays with a large dynamic and finely tunable conductance range (~ 1 MΩ -10 kΩ) to design and experimentally verify the operation of nonlinear RRAM-based PUF primitives. We devise and verify an ex situ network tuning algorithm to optimize the "entropy space" of RRAM arrays. 384 kb-long strings of PUF response data are examined for randomness metrics, worst case reliability, and temperature stability. We further devise and experimentally evaluate instance reconfiguration strategies and introduce a highly robust challenge-obfuscated PUF network structure with improved metrics and information throughput. and reliability in the proposed nonlinear PUF operation, we use a write-verify programming algorithm to keep device states within certain range [54] [55] [56] (Figure 2b ), most optimal for the chosen PUF operation scheme and allowing for detectable current differential margin. Th algorithm assumes a simplified linear model of the analog RRAM network and serves as a computationally efficient weight determination scheme to eliminate inadvertent biases in spatial weight distribution across the network. As such, it can be used as the foundation for sophisticated network optimization algorithms based on more detailed models of nonlinear device and array characteristics.
Tuning and operation of nonlinear PUF primitives
The map of device conductances and the corresponding conductance distribution histogram are illustrated in Figure 2c , d. Figure 2e shows the average device conductances along all rows and columns of the crossbar, denoting a fairly uniform conductance distribution across the array. We use this distribution as the starting point in evaluating the PUF primitive functional performance.
PUF operational metrics
The most common metrics of randomness and reliability in security primitives are interand intra-instance Hamming weight and Hamming distance. In particular, uniformity (UF) is defined as intra-response Hamming weight, while diffuseness (DF) represents intra-PUF Hamming distance. These metrics assess the randomness of a single PUF instance. Bit-error-rate (BER) represents inter-trial Hamming distance between responses to identical challenges and evaluates PUF's reliability. Another important metric is uniqueness (UQ), which is the inter-PUF
Hamming distance between responses to identical challenges and as such effectively a measure of PUF instance uniqueness.
To evaluate the PUF network performance, we use a selection scheme with m = 5 rows and n = 2 columns, while keeping the unselected lines floating, and measure the PUF response at 3 different bias points VB = 200 mV, 400 mV, and 600 mV. The available number of challenge response pairs in this case according to (1) is 697,000. We generate 384 kb of response data at each bias point subject to exclusive random selections, to construct a statistically substantial set and order the results in 64-bit response packets (i.e. total of 6,000 64-bit packets for each bias point are generated). Figure 3a , b show UF, DF, and BER metrics of the network for different biases.
While PUF randomness is already near-ideal for biases VB = 200 mV, it improves further when using higher voltages, i.e. biasing device in strongly nonlinear regime. The reliability of the network also improves substantially at higher biases, which can be partially attributed to improved signal-to-noise ratio. More importantly, an evaluation of uniqueness between different bias responses reveals the unparalleled utility of random variations in conductance nonlinearity (herein referred to as nonlinearity entropy space) in analog RRAM arrays. Spatial distribution of nonlinearity varies significantly both as a function of individual device characteristics and operational bias (Figure 3c, d) . This, in turn, leads to significant redistribution of selection and sneak path currents at different bias points. Thus, responses from the same network to the same input challenges exhibit a high UQ (Figure 3e ). Most prominently, the average UQ between linear (VB = 200 mV) and nonlinear (VB = 600 mV) regimes is 44.8±6.9%, which indicates an almost completely reconfigured entropy space. Such property can be readily translated to more complex and robust PUF structures design, utilizing strategies such as bias scrambling and key reconfiguration, and increasing the response throughput by encoding nonlinearity differential information in the response.
Additionally, we evaluated the stability of network response at higher temperatures ( Figure   3f ). The sharp decline of BER at increased biases, from 16.36±3.1% at 200 mV to 5.93±2.59% at 600 mV, also indicates the benefits of nonlinear operation in RRAM-based PUF networks. The improved response stability can be explained by higher signal-to-noise ratio of the current differentials and more stable charge transport across the filamentary conduction paths. 22 ,49,57,58
PUF Reconfigurability
A critical gauge of competence for hardware security primitives is instance uniqueness (UQ). Since process-induced compositional and structural mismatches in RRAM arrays, sufficient instance uniqueness is a general assumption in most RRAM-based PUF structures. Additionally, PUF instance reconfigurability through array weight re-distribution is considered as one of the major advantages of RRAM-based PUFs, where large RRAM arrays have a sufficiently large conductance variations entropy space to constitute unique instances upon reprogramming. 9, 27, 29, 59 Nevertheless, no meaningful experimental verifications are so far reported.
We have experimentally evaluated the more stringent reconfigurability criteria in nonlinear analog RRAM PUFs through two strategies. In the first approach, we generate five different array weights distribution using the weight tuning algorithm to reprogram a single array (Figure 4a ). We generate 32 kb responses for three different bias points on each distribution, subject to the same set of input challenges. The resulting UQ over these distributions have an ideal mean of 50% for all three bias points ( Figure 4b ). Moreover, response uniqueness distribution improves at higher biases, leading to a small variance of 0.9% at 600 mV. This indicates the higher sensitivity of the nonlinear response to spatial variation and increased robustness of instance randomness in nonlinear operations.
In the second strategy, we generate 10 different distributions using a device "rattling" routine with considerably lower programming time and power. In this approach, we apply short (10 μS) RESET pulses with randomly assigned amplitudes and a maximum amplitude of 70% average RESET threshold, to each device. The resulting conductance distributions are illustrated in Figure 4c . For these distributions, the UQ significantly improves at nonlinear operational points.
While the inter-PUF UQ for linear 200 mV operation is 24.8 ±6.3%, it is upgraded to the near ideal point of 50.07±2.1% for nonlinear 600 mV operation. These results further highlight the utility of embedded RRAM nonlinearity in hardware security primitives. In this case, analog RRAM array can be reconfigured through a fast and low power step to a completely unique instance, operated at its nonlinear regime. Nonetheless, the high bias and spatial sensitivity of RRAM nonlinearity distribution can be utilized to devise even more robust and power efficient reconfiguration methods. To demonstrate the basic performance of the NL-RPUF structure, we have implemented a simplified network with ten input and one output segment arrays. Each segment array in CBAi generates 1 hidden bit to construct a 10-bit HC that is used to address the rows and columns in CBAo and generate a 1-bit response. All segment arrays are implemented sequentially on the same 3D analog array using distributions generated by the "rattling" redistribution strategy (Figure 4c ).
NL-RPUF
Challenges to the input layers are the kept the same for generation of each HC to track the NL-RPUF response uniqueness in a worst-case selection scenario. 32 kb response bits to exclusive random inputs are generated at three bias point (200-600 mV) and ordered in 64-bit packets to 
